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INTERNAL  AUDIT – A KEY ELEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 









ABSTRACT: The world has always been in constant change and evolution, but the rate at which 
changes and the evolution of humanity take place has dramatically increased over the past 70 
years. Corporate governance and internal audit profession were no exception, both evolving with 
great speed. All changes on the global financial markets in the last 10-15 years and the multiple 
crises that the global economy went through during this period produced multiple mutations both in 
the internal audit activity and the role that this activity and the audit committees have in corporate 
governance. There are several aspects that will significantly mark internal audit in the 21st century, 
and the organizations that will take account of these issues will have an internal audit service that 
will truly bring them added value. 
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Corporate governance – history and principles 
The  term  of  “corporate  governance”  has  Anglo-Saxon  origins,  being  mentioned  by  the 
Internal Auditing International Standards. Its meaning is management of the organization or unit. 
Therefore we can define corporate governance as “overall management of the entire organization by 
accepting  all  internal  components  that  work  together,  which  eventually  will  be  integrated  in 
management”. This concept can add the need to implement risk management within the entity and 
in the internal control system and the most important internal audit. The connotations of the concept 
of corporate governance include: ethical principles, social responsibility, control activities and good 
business practice. 
The concept of corporate governance has entered specialized literature relatively recently, 
namely  in  the  last  twenty  years.  Sir  Adrian  Cadbury  Thus,  the  one  who  defined  corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are guided and controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992), 
can be considered one of the pioneers of the concept of corporate governance. He elaborated the 
famous  report  in  1992  that  has  his  name  (Cadbury  Report),  as  a  consequence  of  the  research 
conducted on the causes of corporate bankruptcies during the crisis of the late ‘80s. The report’s 
conclusions revealed that the serious problems regarding organization and operation of  internal 
control represent the major causes of corporate bankruptcies. Thus, we emphasize that the major 
deficiencies  were  on  top  of  the  economic  entities,  their  management  not  being  able  to  avoid 
failures, and, in some cases, even contributed to their emergence. Later on, other reports have also 
been published on the same issue (Hampel-1998 and Turbull-2001), which has strengthened the 
Cadbury’s conclusions.  
It can be said that corporate governance refers to the distribution of rights and obligations 
between different categories of participants in the company activity, namely: the board of managers, 
the executives, the shareholders and other stakeholders, noting how decisions are made, strategies 
and strategic objectives are established, means are met, as well as the financial monitoring system. 
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The lack of a single model of corporate governance at global level, has determined OECD to 
identify  a set of principles of corporate governance  and publish them  in the document entitled 
“OECD - Principles of Corporate Governance 2004”. These principles do not impose restrictions 
and do not take into account a thorough implementation in the national legislation. Their main goal 
is to deliver a reference system, following the identification of goals and the means of achieving 
them. They have an evolutionary character, being examined and revised according to the evolution 
of  global  business.  Thus,  companies  must  continuously  improve  their  corporate  governance 
policies, adapting them to the changes that continuously occur due to the innovation process. 
OECD Principles (Abram V, 2003) are divided into six sections, as follows: 
1. Providing a basis for corporate governance framework taking into account the promotion 
of some principles of transparency and efficiency of markets, which should be in harmony with the 
legislation and clearly formulate the separation of responsibilities between supervisors, authorities 
of normalization and implementation; 
2. Shareholders’ rights and the key functions of ownership pursuing protection and guarantee 
of shareholders’ rights; 
3.  Shareholders’  fair  treatment,  ensuring  a  fair  and  adequate  treatment  within  corporate 
governance, including for foreigners and minority shareholders, stipulating the need to reward all 
shareholders if their rights are violated; 
4. Shareholders’ role in corporate governance is seen as a means of creating value and jobs 
through cooperation between shareholders and companies, corporate governance recognizing the 
shareholders’ rights, stipulated by law; 
5.  Accurate  and  timely  reporting  and  transparency  should  be  provided  in  corporate 
governance in order to obtain a clear image of the organization in terms of performance, capital, 
financial position and its governance; 
6.  Responsibilities  of  the  board  of  administration  must  be  clearly  defined  in  corporate 
governance to ensure effective strategic guidance to entities and to allow effective monitoring of 
executive management by the board of administration, by assuming its responsibilities. 
Corporate  governance  principles  set  forth  by  OECD  were  initially  meant  to  apply  the 
concept of corporate governance in joint stock companies in order to efficiently manage companies, 
but this concept was later extended to other types of organizations, being taken by most developed 
or developing countries. We must observe that the emphasis is on the shareholders’ role and rights, 
on the information transparency and on the crucial importance of company managers. 
OECD principles are universally recognized, representing one of the 12 basic standards of a 
solid  financial  system.  They  serve  as  a  reference  framework  for  achieving  a  large  number  of 
national codes on corporate governance (White Chart of corporate management in South Eastern 
Europe,  the  Stability  Pact,  and  Agreement  of  South  Eastern  Europe  for  reforms,  investments, 
integrity and economic growth). 
The  central  element  of  OECD  principles  is  the  transparency  of  all  financial-accounting 
information, as they are the basis of the decisions made by the information users. The quality of this 
information plays an important role in the efficient administration of entities, leading ultimately to 
the increase of their market value.  
If, at European level, Great Britain can be considered a pioneer in the implementation and, 
subsequently,  the  development  of  corporate  governance,  in  the  U.S.,  the  Sarbanes-Oaxley Act, 
appeared in 2002, is considered the cornerstone in establishing standards regarding the regulation of 
registered companies (KH Spencer Pickett, 2006) at global level. The need for this law, which - in 
case  of  non-compliance  -  imposes  fines  of  millions  of  dollars,  return  of  bonuses  and  serious 
penalties (up to 25 years in prison), was due to the huge financial scandals that shook the U.S. in 
2001-2002 and led to the collapse of some financial giants such as Enron in 2001 and WorldCom in 
2002. 
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Although it uses the same principle: “comply or explain yourself”, just like Great Britain, 
the  Sarbanes-Oaxley  Act  focuses  on  individual  and  corporate  responsibility  as  compared  to 
corporate financial results, but also to the membership of the Audit Committee. The imperatives of 
this  act  against  the  listed  companies  include  several  provisions  regarding  the  managers’ 
independence, governance and audit committees, compensation and remuneration, and codes of 
business conduct. 
Like  the  Combined  Code,  the  American  model  of  corporate  governance  requires  the 
existence of an audit committee composed only of non-executive independent managers who act as 
a  detector of  problems  that  can  occur  within  the  organization.  Section  302  also  stipulates  that 
managers must certify the financial statements and the information given to external auditors, as 
complex, accurate and have responsibility for maintaining and evaluating internal control (Institute 
of Internal Auditors in the UK and Ireland, 2002). 
Sarbanes-Oaxley  Act  is  presently  used  by  a  growing  number  of  jurisdictions  and 
corporations, as it is more complex, closer to the legislative framework and concentrated more on 
internal control, as compared to the other governance models used worldwide. 
 
The importance of internal audit 
The financial and banking system as we know at this point is based on trust rather than on 
any other argument. The lack of trust between those partners who operate in the banking system 
leads to uncertainty, fear, with negative consequences on the activity system as a whole. The present 
global financial crisis is primarily the result of lack of trust between the players in the banking 
system and  lack of transparency. The  lack of transparency and  mistrust were generated  by the 
deficient corporate governance policies and procedures that did not regard a prudent management of 
risks,  a  judicious  administration  of  the  assets,  and  concentration  on  medium  and  long  term 
objectives of banking institutions, which preferred large and immediate profits, accompanied by 
huge risks at the expense of some prudent policies. Poor corporate governance can lead to major 
failures, with adverse consequences for the banking system, due to the impact of deposits insurance 
system, payment system and especially the contamination risk. 
Corporate governance within credit  institutions  can  be defined, according to BIS (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations, 
2006), as “the manner in which bank businesses and relationships are governed by the board of 
administration and management, which involves the way they set goals, make daily business, fulfill 
their  obligations  and  responsibilities  to  shareholders  and  other  interest owners,  while  the  bank 
activities and behavior are aligned with the operating expectations in a safe and healthy way, in 
accordance with the laws and regulations, and protect the interests of depositors”. 
A very important aspect of corporate governance of any banking institution consists in the 
existence of the following forms of supervision: supervision provided by the board of managers or 
the  board  of  supervisors,  supervision  provided  by  non-executive  members,  supervision  made 
directly to the activity departments of the bank, the existence of some independent audit functions, 
compliance and risk management. 
Analyzing the concept of corporate governance and the principles outlined in the previous 
chapter, we conclude that the basis of corporate governance is the independence of the board of 
managers as compared to the executive management.  
Ensuring this independence is one of the most important responsibilities of internal audit 
within credit  institutions. To this end  internal auditors evaluate the effectiveness of governance 
structure of the bank, the independence of the internal audit function, the organization’s ethical 
values, and performance management of the credit institution. 
In this way, internal auditors help to promote an ethical culture within the credit institution. 
Taking into consideration the information presented before, we conclude that the bank internal audit 
is the main goal to contribute to the banking objectives in order to improve their activity. Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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Corporate governance within credit institutions is based on a set of principles that should be 
applied regardless of the bank ownership: state or private. These principles were formulated by the 
International Regulation Bank, as follows: 
Principle 1: Board members must possess the necessary professional qualification for the 
occupied position to fully understand their  role  in governance and have the ability to exercise 
common sense on the bank business. 
Principle  2:  The  Board  of  Managers  must  approve  and  oversee  the  banking  strategic 
objectives and ensure that its corporate values are disseminated within the organization. 
Principle 3: The Board must establish clear areas of responsibility within the bank. 
Principle 4: The Board should ensure that management exercise appropriate supervision by 
board policies. 
Principle 5: The Board of Managers and management should effectively utilize the results of 
the activities of the internal and external auditors as well as of the internal controllers. 
Principle 6: The Board should ensure that remuneration policies are consistent with the 
bank corporate culture, the objectives and its strategy on a long-term and the control environment. 
Principle 7: The bank should be governed in a transparent manner. 
Principle  8:  The  Board  of  Managers  and  management  should  understand  the  bank 
operational structure, including in various situations in which it operates under jurisdictions or 
structures that restrict transparency. 
In recent years, global discussions on corporate governance have been intensified in general 
and the number of supervisors and audit committees has grown in particular, because over time, the 
audit committees have received  more and  more responsibilities,  including the direct or indirect 
supervision of all processes and internal audit functions. 
In  the  U.S.,  the  audit  committee  has  become  a  necessary  component  of  corporate 
governance system of large financial institutions. Sarbanes Oaxley  is very clear in this respect, 
stipulating the mandatory existence within the organizations listed on the NYSE (the American 
Stock Exchange) and of those under the supervision of the FDIC (the U.S. equivalent of the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund), and an audit committee composed of independent non-executive managers. In the 
EU and the UK, the Combined Code does not require an audit committee, but only recommends its 
existence. Although Winter Group has taken important steps in terms of the role of internal audit in 
corporate governance, it did not detail on the provisions of internal audit and did not support the 
idea of a unitary corporate governance in the EU. However, all major European financial groups 
have audit committees in their corporate governance structure. 
The size of the audit committee varies from a credit institution to another depending on 
more factors. A study that analyzed the composition of the Audit Committee of 25 large European 
banks in 2008 (David Ladipo, Stilpon Nestor, 2009) reveals that the number of the audit committee 
members fluctuates between 3 (UBS Raiffesien, Dexia) and 9 (Erste Bank). 
The  audit  committee  and  the  internal  auditors  should  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  risk 
management procedures issued by the board of managers. Traditionally, internal auditors carried out 
an  independent  assessment  of  the  level  of  compliance  with  the  internal  control  procedures, 
accounting practices and systems within the bank. Still, the latest trends in the internal audit activity 
describe its role as being one to provide assurance regarding risk management processes, control 
systems, and not least the bank’s corporate governance. This can be achieved only by understanding 
and analysis of the key indicators that govern each business line of the credit institution. Although 
the audit committees play a valuable role in assisting executive management in identifying and 
managing  the  business  risk  areas,  the  primary  responsibility  in  risk  management  cannot  be 
transferred to them, rather being integrated at all management levels. 
The objectives of the audit committee include: helping management identify and manage 
risks, providing an independent assessment of control systems and risk management, evaluating the 
efficiency,  the  effectiveness  and  the  costs  of  operations,  assessing  the  compliance  with  laws, Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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procedures, regulations and other operating instructions, evaluating credibility of the information 
provided  by  the  accounting  and  computerized  systems,  providing  investigations  to  superior 
management. 
Currently, internal audit operates on two levels. First, internal auditors provide an objective 
and independent assessment regarding the structure of corporate governance (if it meets the needs 
of  the  respective  entity),  as  well  as  regarding  the  effectiveness  of  the  operations  specific  for 
governance  activities.  Second,  internal  auditors  act  as  a  catalyst  for  change,  providing 
recommendations or suggestions in order to strengthen corporate governance practices and structure 
of financial institutions. 
In an organization, superior management and the board of managers establish and monitor 
large systems in order to achieve effective corporate governance. Internal auditors can support and 
improve these activities. Moreover, although internal auditors must remain independent, they could 
involve themselves in setting corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, providing assurance on risk 
management,  control  systems  and  corporate  governance  processes  of  the  organization,  internal 
auditors  become  a  key  element  of  effective  corporate  governance.  The  effective  corporate 
governance  attributes  are:  relevant  and  reliable  public  reporting,  to  avoid  the  excessive 
concentration of power on top of the organization, a strong and independent board of managers, and 
the existence of effective risk control and assessment systems, strong internal and external audit 
processes. 
The way  internal audit  work in the corporate governance of  financial  institutions  varies 
according to the maturity degree of the corporate governance structure and processes of each entity 
separately.  Thus,  in  an  organization  with  a  low  maturity  degree  of  governance  structure  and 
processes, the internal audit will focus more on providing advice on best practices and corporate 
governance structures, while making an analysis of how the existing governance structures and 
processes meet the requirements requested by supervisors and other regulators. In terms of financial 
institutions which have mature governance structures and processes, the internal audit regards the 
main areas of action:  it evaluates  if the different components of corporate governance  function 
together well, it analyzes the transparency degree of the reports made between different parts of the 
governance structure, it makes a comparison of best practices of governance, and it sets out how the 
codes of governance are recognized and enforced. 
At this point, the internal audit is involved in all corporate governance processes, just like 
the audit committees in the past were focused more on analyzing the financial statements of risk and 
control. Today we are the witnesses of a process of rebranding the internal audit process in which 
the internal auditor gains increasingly more recognition from the stakeholders. At this moment it is 
not enough for the credit institutions, and companies in genera, to declare that they organized the 
internal audit activity, as stakeholders will seek confirmation that the internal audit is conducted on 
a truly professional framework regarding the role of consultant, insurance advisor and provider. 
 
Internal audit – an essential element of corporate governance in credit institutions 
Due  to  its  unique  position  they  enjoy  within  the  company  in  general,  and  the  credit 
institutions in particular, internal auditors spend more time to understand the culture, the systems, 
the industry, the business associated with the risks of the operations of these entities. Thus, they will 
be perceived as the most able persons to provide valuable advice to the board of managers and to 
executive management. Internal auditors become part of the company’s management, and they are 
forced to act as business partners and not be perceived as those that are guilty or deal only with the 
identification of mistakes. 
The nature of internal audit is another element that will define the future of this profession 
within the organization, in general, and of the credit institutions, in particular. Stakeholders have 
started  to  realize  the  importance  of  internal  audit  in  corporate  governance.  More  and  more Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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stakeholders rely on the internal auditors’ work; the improvement of the coordination of internal 
audit with the external audit will lead to an increase in this trend. 
Risk  management  is  a  domain  where  the  internal  audit  role  has  changed  and  is  still 
changing. The global financial crisis that led to the collapse of some credit institutions famous on 
the financial market showed more than ever the need for change in terms of risk management and 
internal audit and the role that the audit committees must hold in this activity. Although, like any 
change, there is opposition, it is obvious that we need new approaches to risk management in terms 
of internal audit. Thus, internal audit will have an increasingly important role in risk management. 
The credit institutions must take into account that the head of the internal audit department must get 
involved in strategic risk issues. Consequently, we can ensure the efforts of alignment of internal 
audit activity to risk strategy adopted by the credit institution. This involvement of the head of the 
internal audit department regarding risk management issues does not diminish the primary role that 
executive management has in implementing risk management strategies. The result of this approach 
will be that, when the executive management and the audit committee review risk management 
activities, they will be eligible for assistance and recommendations to strengthen its internal audit 
from the internal audit. 
Focusing on the evaluation of risk management systems and the identification of key risks, 
internal audit helps the organization to know the key risks it must face and to ensure that there are 
existing  mechanisms  to  manage  those  risks  when  they  occur.  Thus,  internal  audit  will  have  a 
rational approach in selecting the risk areas that it reviews each year, thus being able to provide an 
overall assessment of the organization’s risk management systems and internal control of the entity. 
This general opinion is requested more and more by the head of the internal audit department due to 
increasing external pressures to publish control systems and risk management in the existing risk 
credit institutions. Yet, internal auditors should take into account that their role does not completely 
eliminate risks, but keeps them at an acceptable level for the organization when the costs of benefits 
do  not  surpass  the  benefits  that  could  be  achieved  through  the  control  activity.  Also,  internal 
auditors should understand how great are the risks that the credit institution wishes to take and 
which are the areas of action of these risks. Another important task of internal audit is to evaluate 
the capacity of the credit institution to cope with those risks that have been identified and, although 
they were identified, underestimated the impact on the organization or the probability that those 
risks affect the credit institution. 
Corporate social responsibility is an element that derives from the attention and the respect 
that we need to pay to our environment. Internal auditors play a vital role in understanding the risks 
arising from corporate social responsibility. Companies need to respect the environment in which 
they operate, to respect the social, to pay for the economic obligations, and, at the same time, to 
become competitive. Internal auditors should update the global standards and initiatives related to 
the corporate social responsibility, since they measure the level of corporate social responsibility. 
The internal auditors’ need to have multidimensional knowledge vitally adds value to the 
organization. In the era of rapid technological advances, changes in the business environment and 
globalization, the internal auditors’ ownership of knowledge in various fields is a mandatory feature 
of their professional capacity. Thus, in the financial services industry, and, especially, in the banking 
industry, the internal auditors must have various Banking Audit Certificate and Financial Services 
Diploma that will enhance their credibility in these areas. 
                    
New trends and perspectives regarding the role of internal audit in corporate governance 
Corporate governance in credit institutions must be reinvented. Corporate governance bodies 
of these economic entities must become smaller in terms of number of members in order to be more 
professional  and  aim  to  ensure  long-term  solvency  of  the  financial  institutions  they  govern. 
Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the number of members that make up corporate governance 
bodies, accepting a maximum of 9-12 members. It was noted that banks that have larger bodies than Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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the average corporate governance system, they are the least efficient among the largest 25 European 
banks (David Ladipo, Stilpon  Nestor, 2009). Another direction of  action  meant to increase the 
efficiency of corporate governance in credit institutions is the need for expertise in the financial 
industry for a significant part of corporate governance bodies and especially the board president. 
Recent studies highlight the fact that in 2010 only 64% of the presidents in the 25 largest European 
banks have any financial experience, compared with 80% in 2007. 
Non-executive managers who form the corporate governance bodies should be involved as 
little  engagements  as  possible,  compared  with  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  In  Europe,  many 
members of various boards of managers and audit committees in top banks admit that they do not 
allocate  enough  time  for  the  tasks  they  must  perform  within  those  bodies.  Banks  should  also 
remunerate non-executive managers better than they do it in the present, especially if they require 
more time to devote to their activity. The best banks offer the best salaries to their non-executive 
managers. But at this point one may find an upside-down relationship between the responsibilities 
of non-executive managers and the remuneration they receive, meaning that they get less money for 
some increased attributions. 
Another burning question is about the performance based on remuneration of the managers 
responsible with long-term solvency of credit institutions. Some analysts believe that it is necessary 
to  link  the  remuneration  of  these  non-executive  managers  with  the  achievement  of  long-term 
objectives regarding the solvency of financial institutions, as this measure would further empower 
the members of corporate management. Other commentators believe that such an approach is not 
appropriate  for  non-executive  managers  whose  basic  responsibilities  are  to  ensure  long-term 
solvency of the credit institutions they manage.  
In our opinion, the remuneration should be designed based on two components: the cash that 
should not be tied to bank performance, because of the lack of correlation between the cash bonus 
received by non-executive managers and the solvency of the financial entities limits the excessive 
risk  exposure,  because  there  is  no  temptation  to  obtain  higher  cash  income  depending  on  the 
reported figures, even if it means lower returns for shareholders and another component based on 
stock-options granting for non-executive managers. The latter should be the dominant part of the 
salary and bonus package, and represents an additional argument for managers to be more cautious 
and to fulfill their duties  more consciously. If the personal  financial  situation of  non-executive 
managers is linked to the credit institution they serve, they have a greater responsibility as they have 
a high interest in doing things well and benefit from the good results obtained by the company.  
At the same time, one must bring into question the role of non-executive managers who 
form the remuneration committees regarding the bonus policy to management and the board of 
directors.  Non-executive  managers  can  help  mitigate  the  influence  that  shareholders  exert over 
CEO’s to obtain short-term results, including the reduction of the pressure to take excessive risks 
because the CEO’s bonus package is currently influenced by the shareholders and it reflects their 
desire  for  risk.  Regulators  worldwide  are  striving  to  limit  this  pressure  exerted  against  the 
executives and the board members. Thus, in the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act obliges U.S. corporations 
to provide the necessary funds for the remuneration committee to assure its independence, and also 
its control on the bonus policies of the credit institutions. In September 2010, the G20 has released 
the standards regarding the compensation packages offered for top managers and board members, 
suggesting that - within the credit institutions - remuneration committees should establish the wage 
policies of that organization. The recommendations issued both by the U.S. Federal Reserve and by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision suggest that the wage policies in the credit institution 
must be established by the remuneration committee. The purpose of such measures is to ensure that 
bankers  no  longer  take  excessive  risks,  generating  losses  for  creditors  and  taxpayers.  Another 
objective is to offer a link between the payment of salaries and bonuses or any losses incurred by 
the credit institution. In this sense, more and more CEO’s are have to accept the compensation 
packages with a component formed mainly of shares or stock options instead of cash. Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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Another measure designed to streamline corporate governance of credit institutions consists 
of a stronger accountability of non-executive managers who are members of corporate governance 
bodies. This responsibility should not be left to shareholders, but it must be imposed by regulatory 
and supervisory authorities. Thus, things would be different if there is a legal mechanism - even if 
limited - to make managers responsible for the failure of the credit institutions they manage. In this 
way they could be held responsible if it turns out that they did not properly fulfill their obligations 
to the corporation they serve. As Lord Turner noted (Jeffrey Ridley, John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 
member of the FSA (supervisory and regulatory body of the UK  financial system), the  inquiry 
conducted as a result of the nationalization of RBS Bank by the UK government, the FSA has no 
power to take action against RBS managers who have not fulfilled their obligations according to 
law. 
All measures and proposals to increase the effectiveness and to rethink the aforementioned 
corporate governance are closely linked to the strengthening and enhancing of the role that internal 
audit and audit committees play within the governance. The audit committee is one of the key 
corporate governance bodies of the credit institutions. Being elected by the shareholders of the 
organization, the audit committee is the supreme entity before which the internal audit department 
is  responsible.  Therefore,  between  the  two  entities  must  be  a  relationship  that  includes  both 
functions and supervisory reporting. Also, the audit committee and the internal audit department 
should  be able to have unlimited  access to each other. The  internal audit committee  is  largely 
dependent on the functioning of the internal audit, in terms of assessment of risk, management and 
internal control system. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  reach  the  objectives  set  by  the  corporate  governance,  the  audit 
committee members, namely the non-executive managers should receive quality information in real 
time  from the  internal audit department. In other words, the implementation of some  measures 
meant to increase efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance in financial institutions, as 
we have shown in the previous lines, largely contributes to the professionalism and the competence 
of the internal audit department.  
Strengthening the internal audit activity is a complex and continuous process due to its vital 
role that this activity holds within companies. To increase the quality of the results of internal audit 
one should pay an increased attention to assess the nature, extension, quality of control processes 
and  procedures  of  the  credit  institutions.  It  requires  that  the  internal  audit  department  to  be 
composed of highly qualified personnel, experience, able to identify problems and act appropriately. 
In all complex organizations such as those in the financial and banking industry, internal 
auditors cannot act as generalists. They must possess knowledge and expertise, depending on the 
risks that threaten the entity they belong. Internal auditors should also prove a highly moral attitude 
and verticality to face the pressure from managers and various business lines of credit institutions. 
Those who step back and give way to these pressures, weaken the corporate governance of the 
respective organization. 
It is very important to discuss with executive managers about all the detected problems, and 
regular information reports must be provided to the audit committee. These issues must be also 
brought in the auditors’ attention and discussed with them. 
But  the  most  important  aspect  of  a  truly  valuable  internal  audit  activity  for  corporate 
governance of the credit institutions is that internal auditors should always make sure that their 
proposals and recommendations are completely implemented on time. Any deficiencies that are 
discovered and are not solved in time or properly represent a huge threat to the control activity and 




 Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
  395   
References 
1.  Anson  M.,  2003.  Corporate  Governance  Ratings:  Come  of  Age,  Amsterdam,  IGGN 
Conference 
2. Avram  V.,  2003.  Management  of  the  value  creation  process  in  the  context  of  enterprise 
governance, Bucharest, Economic Publishing House; 
3.  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision;  1998  .  Enhancing  bank  transparency, 
http://www.bis.org, 21.09.2011 
4.  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision;  2006.  Enhancing  corporate  governance  for 
banking organizations, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/, 22.09.2011 
5. Baker H. K., Anderson R., 2010. Corporate governance - A synthesis of theory, research and 
practice, Hoboken, New Jersey John Wiley and Sons Inc 
6. Buzatu L., 2004. The capital market in Romania, identifying new ways and opportunities of 
developing and diversifying it, Doctoral thesis, scientific coordinator PhD Prof. Alexandru 
Puiu, Bucharest, ASE 
7.  Cadbury  Report,  1992.  Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Financial Aspects  of  Corporate 
Governance, http://www.ecgi.org, 1.10.2011 
8. Dobroteanu C.L, Dobroteanu L., 2007. Internal audit, Bucharest, InfoMega Publishing House 
9. Dochia A., 2001. Report on corporate governance in Romania, presented within the OECD 
conference in Bucharest, http://www.oecd.org, 12.09.2011 
10. Greuning van Hennie, Bratanovic Brajovic S., 2009. Analyzing banking risk - A framework 
for  assessing  corporate  governance  and  risk  management,  DC,  USA  World  Bank, 
Washington 
11.  Gup  E.  Benton,  2007.  Corporate  governance  in  banking  - A  global  perspective,  United 
Kingdom, Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
14.  Iosivan  O.R.,  2010.  Auditing  in  Europe  –  Evolution  and  trends,  Revista  Economică, 
no.6(53), vol.II, pp.44-51 
15. Ivan O.R., 2009. European Standardization of Audit, Annals of the University of Petrosani, 
Economics, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp.5-14 
16. Pickett K.H. Spencer, 2006. The Internal Audit Handbook, Second Edition, River Street, 
Hoboken John Wiley & Sons, III 
17. Nestor Stilpon, Ladipo David, 2009. Bank boards and the financial  crisis - A corporate 
governance study of the 25 largest European banks, London, Nestor Advisors Ltd. 
18.  Nestor  Stilpon,  2001.  International  Efforts  to  Improve  corporate  governance:  Why  and 
How? OECD, http://www.oecd.org, 15.09.2011 
19. Ridley J., 2007. Cutting Edge Internal Auditing, Washinton, DC., John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
20. Soltani Bahram, 2007. Auditing-An international approach, Edinburgh, Pearson Education 
Limited 
21.  Smith  J.,  2003.  Audit  Committees  Combined  Code  Guidance,  http://www.kpmg.co.uk, 
1.09.2011 
22. Standard & Poor’s, Corporate Governance Scores-Criteria, Methodology and Definitions, 
http://www.kantakji.com, 5.09.2011 
23. Cartea Alba a administrarii corporatiilor in sud-estul Europei, Pactul de stabilitate, Acordul 
Europei  de  Sud-Est  pentru  reforma,  investitii,  integritate  si  crestere  economica, 
http://www.oecd.org, 15.09.2011 
24. Institutul Auditorilor Interni din Marea Britanie si Irland; 2002, Corporate governance and 
risk management, Second edition, http://www.iia.org.uk, 5.09.2011 
25.  The  Value  Agenda;  2002,  Deloitte  &  Touche  and  IIA-UK  &  Ireland,  London,   
www.deloitte.com, 14.09.2011  
26.   www.ccir.ro; 20.09.2011 
27. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf, 15.09.2011 